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THE WHOLE WIDE WORLD: RECOGNIZING

JUS COGENS VIOLATIONS UNDER
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Ursula Tracy Doyle t

INTRODUCTION

In August 2014, the international community learned that members of
the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) had committed widespread
human rights abuses-including but not limited to sexual slavery, torture,
and killing-against the Yazidis,l a religious community 2 with origins in
Iraq.3 Two years later, a United Nations commission declared the ongoing
activity genocide.4 The commission urged the United Nations Security
Council to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court or to create

t Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law (Chase), Northern
Kentucky University; Cornell University, A.B.; Columbia University, M.A.; Indiana
University-Bloomington School of Law, J.D. I thank the following for their very helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article: George E. Edwards, Jena Martin and participants in the Chase Faculty Scholarship Workshop. I also thank the members of the
BUFFALo HUMAN RIGHTS LAw REVIEW for their excellent editorial assistance. Any and
all errors herein are, of course, my own.
1. United Nations Human Rights Council, Thirty-Second Session, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (Commission), A/HRC/
32/CRP.2 (June 15, 2016).

2. Id. at 3.
3. Id.

4. The Commission details the Yazidis treatment by ISIS as follows:
ISIS has sought to destroy the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing

serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about
a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being
born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own fami-

lies and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and
practices of their own religious community, and erasing their identity as Yazidis.
The public statements and conduct of ISIS and its fighters clearly demonstrate that
ISIS intended to destroy the Yazidis of Sinjar, composing the majority of the
world's Yazidi population, in whole or in part.

Id. In August 2017, the Iraq Government requested the assistance of the UN Security Council in holding ISIS accountable for crimes against humanity. See Letter from
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq Addressed to United Nations Secretary General: From Republic of Iraq (Aug. 14, 2017). https://en.calameo.com/read/
005253664097abb2342ef

46

BUFFALo HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

an ad hoc tribunal to address these atrocities.5 Because of their heinousness,
genocide, torture, and a small group of other acts are, at international law,
considered jus cogens violations, a calumny to every nation. 6 Also known
as universal offenses, these acts are the business of every State, their remedy every State's responsibility.7 Given their global character, efforts at
their redress, at least theoretically, carry reduced comity risks."
However, despite the gravity of the harm inflicted on the Yazidis by
ISIS perpetrators and the imputed offense of the international community,
at this writing, the International Criminal Court has not prosecuted an ISIS
perpetrator and the United Nations has not convened a related ad hoc tribunal. 9 The civil justice system available to the Yazidis may offer little more
hope. There are obvious rule of law challenges in Iraq and Syria, casting
doubt on the capacity of these States to vindicate human rights claims in a
way that would provide recompense for harm. Additionally, in the United
States, the landmark Alien Tort Statute (ATS)IO-which, in years past, provided jurisdiction to those similarly situated to the Yazidis-is in retreat.
The ATS cannot serve as an option for the Yazidis if U.S. courts continue
to narrowly read the recent United States Supreme Court cases Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Shell and European Community v. RJR Nabisco to
the end of foreclosing a claim of direct liability against a natural person for
even the most extreme human rights atrocities because the conduct relevant
to the claim did not literally occur in the territorial United States."
The ATS states simply that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 2 The statute
provides jurisdiction only;' 3 it does not provide a cause of action, as some
5. 5. Id. at 1.

6. See generally United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session, Second Report on Jus Cogens, Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, March 16, 2017 (Second Report) [hereinafter: Tladi, Second Report].
7. Id.
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in

part and concurring in judgment).
9. To date (May 29, 2018), the International Criminal Court has not opened a case
concerning the ISIS persecutions. Likewise, to date, no ad hoc tribunal has been established to address these persecutions.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
11. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
13. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 ("[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action . . . .").
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courts once thought.1 4 The Supreme Court made this much needed clarification in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, its first foray into the morass that has
become ATS jurisprudence.' 5 Notwithstanding this clarification, there remain questions about the statute's operation, particularly since Kiobel, in
which the Court held that the statutory canon of interpretation known as the
"presumption against extraterritoriality" applies to the ATS.1 6 According to
the Court, this presumption protects international relations as it prevents
U.S. courts from adjudicating matters that principally occurred overseas.' 7
The presumption means what its name implies: "[that] '[w]hen a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."" 8
The Court further held that the presumption applied to the ATS can only be
displaced if the claim alleged pursuant to the statute "touch[es] and concem[s]"' 9 the United States "with sufficient force." 2 0 The Court suggested
that lower courts make this determination by identifying the location of the
"relevant conduct" that gave rise to the claim. 2 1
Prior to Kiobel, plaintiffs had some, if not much, success bringing
human rights claims under the ATS, including where the conduct giving
rise to the claim occurred in a foreign State and all the parties were foreign.
There was no requirement pre-Kiobel that a claim have a U.S. connection,
whether literal or metaphorical, to ground subject matter jurisdiction under
the statute. Many types of claims worked to sustain ATS jurisdiction: those
against natural 22 and juridical 23 persons, those alleging direct 24 and indi14. Id. ("The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number

of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time."); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 ("The statute provides district courts with jurisdiction to hear
certain claims, but does not expressly provide any causes of action."); see also Ingrid
Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 NoTRE DAME

L.

REv.

1941 (2010), for a thorough discussion about the interrelationship

between international law and federal common law in ATS jurisprudence.
15. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
16. Kiobel, 569 U.S.at 117.
17. Id. at 115-16.
18. Id. at 115 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
248 (2010)).
19. Id. at 124-25.
20. Id. at 125.
21. Id. at 124.
22. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Filartigav. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga.
2002); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
23. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Bowoto v. Chevron, 557 F.

Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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liability, those with 2 6 and without 2 7 U.S. connections, and those with
admixtures of the above.
This seemingly "come one, come all" approach to ATS jurisdiction has
spawned numerous debates about the proper scope of the statute. 28 Kiobel
settled few of them 29 and created more. Indeed, it held that the plaintiff
must allege some meaningful U.S. connection for the law of nations violation to be recognized under the ATS. 30 It did not, however, provide any
guidance for determining what satisfies. It did not discuss the particular
type of person (natural or juridical) subject to ATS jurisdiction. It did not
address the kind of liability (direct or indirect) recognized under the statute.
It did not consider the significance of the type of international law violation
alleged (jus cogens or not).
rect2 5

24. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d 844; Filartiga,630 F.2d 876; Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d
1322.
25. In re MarcosHuman Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax, 886
F. Supp. 162.
26. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163; Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080.
27. In re Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493; Filartiga,630 F.2d 876;
Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322.
28. Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga:A Comparative and InternationalLaw
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT'L L.

1, 44 (2002) ("As applied to the broad range of transnational law litigation,

including Fildrtiga-typecases, the key step is to recognize that this well-established
international law doctrine authorizes jurisdiction over civil claims as well as criminal
prosecutions.") (emphasis added); Charles F. Marshall, Re-Framing the Alien Tort Act
After Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 591, 612-13 (1996) ("Filartiga never confronts the historical evidence pointing out the real purpose of the original

§ 1350: to allow aliens to bring suits in U.S. federal courts in order to avoid a foreign
conflict with the alien's home state. Allowing [this] jurisdiction . . . might often trigger
the opposite effect of instigating such conflict.") (citation omitted); Kenneth C. Randall,
FederalJurisdictionOver InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 1, 71 (1985) ("In the aftermath of Filartigav. PenaIrala, federal courts have frequently expressed confusion and disagreement concerning
the meaning and application of the Alien Tort Statute."); see also Richard B. Lillich,
Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367,
400-01 (1985) ("Important as Filartigais in establishing that torture violates customary

international law, the case is even more significant in demonstrating to lawyers the
growing importance of customary international human rights law and graphically illustrating how they should go about proving it in cases before domestic courts.").
29. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Kiobel (quite
purposely) did not enumerate the specific kinds of connections to the United States that
could establish that ATS claims 'touch and concern' this country.").
30. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124.
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The Supreme Court further added to the uncertainty about the breadth
of the statute with its decision in RJR Nabisco. Although this case did not
concern the extraterritorial application of the ATS, it did concern the extraterritorial application of a statute-the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 3 1-thus giving the Court an opportunity to pronounce
broadly on the approach that lower courts should take when confronted with
the question of the extraterritoriality of any statute.3 2 The Court stated that
lower courts must apply a two-step framework. They must: (1) consider
"whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially"; 33 and (2) if it does not, determine "[i]f the conduct relevant
to the statute's focus occurred in the United States." 34 If such conduct occurred in the United States, according to the Court, then the statute may be
applied no matter "if other conduct occurred abroad." 35 If, however, relevant conduct "occurred in a foreign country," 36 the Court opined, then ATS
jurisdiction will not lie "regardless of any other conduct that occurred in
U.S. territory."37
In prescribing this framework, the Court noted that a statute's focus
determines the kind of conduct that is relevant. However, it also observed
that it had not previously identified the focus of the ATS. 3 8 (It did not do so
in the instant case either.) Thus, to the already crowded Kiobel debate, RJR
Nabisco adds new questions about relevant conduct, including its substantive criteria and territorial limits. Kiobel certainly raised questions about
relevant conduct but there the Supreme Court did not expressly prescribe a
test or jurisdictional framework reliant on a consideration of this notion,
allowing courts to determine independently if, when, and how they might
consider relevant conduct when determining the propriety of ATS jurisdiction. Subsequent to Kiobel, many courts have considered this concept when
engaged in this inquiry. 39 However, it was not until the Supreme Court decided RJR Nabisco and enunciated its two-step framework that clarity regarding the meaning and scope of relevant conduct became essential. That
clarity begs. The Court's recent decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC likewise provides no answer to these questions. There, the Court held that "for31. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2016).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2101.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra at 21-25.
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eign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS." 40
It reasoned that Congress, given its law-making and foreign policy-setting
roles, must determine whether ATS liability should be extended to foreign
corporations, not courts. 4 1 While an unquestionably landmark decision,
Jesnerdoes not expand or limit the capacity of the ATS to ground jurisdiction over a claim of direct liability against a natural person for a jus cogens
violation. That capacity continues to be determined by Jesner's antecedents
Kiobel and RJR Nabisco.
This article contends that the jurisprudential lacunae created by Kiobel
and RJR Nabisco-regardingthe kind of liability, class of defendant, type
of international law violation, and degree of extraterritoriality cognizable
under the ATS-allow for the kind of claim that the Yazidis might bring
pursuant to the statute. Despite the conduct relevant to their claim likely
occurring entirely abroad, this group, foreign nationals, might be poised to
sue their individual perpetrators, also foreign nationals, in the United States.
Should they allege direct liability for genocide and torture, amongst other
abuses, their claims would concern jus cogens violations. 4 2 They would thus
bring the now fraught "foreign-cubed claim," alleging that the defendants
were directly liable for breaching the most sacrosanct of international law
standards.
That said, despite their clear injury, the Yazidis might be another set of
similarly situated plaintiffs left remediless in the aftermath of Kiobel. Because these plaintiffs' claims were foreign-cubed, courts did not find anything that displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality. 43 In other
words, courts looked for relevant conduct in the territorial United States and
found none. Thus, courts dismissed these claims, along with many of their
kin, including those alleging aiding and abetting liability against both natural and juridical persons for jus cogens violations that occurred abroad.44
Kiobel, however, does not appear to contemplate the significance of
allegations of direct liability-whether for a jus cogens violation or notand nor does it appear to consider the significance of allegations against a
natural person. 45 RJR Nabisco does not concern an ATS claim at all. 4 6 As
40.
41.
42.
43.

40. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018).
41. Id. at 1407-1408.
See discussion infra at 8-15.
Id.

44. See Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Diving Balancing
Factors from Kiobel's "Touch and Concern" Test, 66 HASTINGs L. J. 443,444-45

(2015).
45. See generally Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108.
46. See generally RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090.
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noted, it regards the extraterritoriality of RICO, 4 7 a legal scenario that does
not lend itself to discussion about the nuances of claims brought pursuant to
the ATS. It certainly does not fill in the blanks left by Kiobel concerning the
substantive and territorial reach of the ATS. These cases, then, should not
preclude the kind of claim ascribed here to the Yazidis.
As many courts-domestic, foreign, and international-have observed, jus cogens norms are in a class by themselves. 48 Because they are
singular, this article asserts that the United States Supreme Court must
clearly and expressly pronounce if all claims concerning their violation are
insufficient to ground ATS jurisdiction without a territorial U.S. connection. This requirement seems particularly necessary in the case of a direct
liability claim against a natural person given the immediacy of such a
charge. A jus cogens claim pursuant to this construct is simply too serious
to be subsumed by holdings directly responsive to an entirely different set
of facts, requiring an entirely different legal analysis. This article, then,
posits that neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco mandates the summary dismissal
of the ATS claim that possesses the features of the would-be Yazidi case
because that case would allege facts that the Supreme Court has not expressly precluded as a ground for recognizing ATS jurisdiction.
Put another way, Kiobel and RJR Nabisco arguably leave room for the
kind of claim, pursuant to the ATS, considered in the seminal case Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala.49 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recognized that torture is a violation of the law of nations and thus
cognizable under the ATS. 0 It then concluded that ATS jurisdiction was
proper in the case before it, which alleged direct liability for torture, and
was brought by Paraguayan nationals against another Paraguayan national
for conduct that occurred in Paraguay. 51 Filartiga was the first of many
47. Id. at 2098.
48. See generally Tladi, Second Report supranote 6, at 11-13 (observing the numerous courts that recognize and accord legal meaning to jus cogens norms, including
the Supreme Court of Argentina, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Tribunal for the For-

mer Yugoslavia, Court of First Instance of the Court of Justice of the European Union,
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights).

49. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 876.
50. Id. at 884 ("Having examined the sources from which customary international
law is derived-the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists-we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is
clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens.").
51. Id. at 878. This is the case that launched a thousand lawsuits as it demonstrated to the world that the United States had a statute which allowed for subject matter
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decisions, pre-Kiobel, where courts were apparently compelled by the gravity of the alleged violation, allowing such an allegation to overcome any
claim that the matter lacked a sufficient nexus with the United States to
sustain subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. 5 2
In some of these cases, courts also considered the meaning at international law of the jus cogens claim; they did not solely recognize the tragedy
of the alleged facts that gave rise to the claim.53 They acknowledged that
thejus cogens breach was the gravest at international law and caused global
injury. 54 These courts considered the significance of the jus cogens claim in
ATS jurisprudence broadly but also in a subspecies of this jurisprudence
involving foreign official immunity.5 5 This article suggests that an allegation of direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural person
warrants this level of scrutiny (and perhaps this is especially so when mass
atrocity is at issue, as would be the case for the Yazidis).
Part I of this article discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the jus
cogens norm. Part II considers the treatment by courts, pre-Kiobel, of
claims of direct liability against a natural person for jus cogens violations
brought pursuant to the ATS. Part III discusses Kiobel and its implications
for these claims. Part IV explores courts' handling of ATS cases with Filartiga-type56 features post-Kiobel. Part V discusses RJR Nabisco and its
meaning for ATS cases. Part VI discusses courts' handling of ATS cases
with Filartiga-typefeatures post-RJR Nabisco.5 7 Part VII discusses the significance of recent cases where courts allowed allegations of jus cogens
violations to defeat foreign official immunity. Finally, Part VIII suggests
how courts should decide the question of ATS jurisdiction, in light of these
two cases, when the claimant alleges direct liability against a natural person
for a jus cogens violation.
jurisdiction over the most egregious human rights abuses, even if the parties were foreign and the offense occurred abroad.
52. See discussion infra at 15-18.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See discussion infra at 30-33.
56. See Stephens, supra note 28, at 44 for an early use of this term.
57. At this writing, there are only two cases post-RJR Nabisco that come close to
being "Filartiga-types":Adhikari v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir.
2017) and Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1136-39 (E.D. Wash. 2017). A
foreign-cubed case, where the plaintiffs allege direct liability against a natural person
for torture, Adhikari closely tracks Filartiga.By contrast, Salim is foreign-squared. The
plaintiffs and place of injury are foreign but the defendants are U.S. nationals. The
plaintiffs do, however, allege that these defendants are directly liable to them for torture. See discussion infra at 28-30.
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Jus COGENS

Per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus cogens norm
"is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character." 8 The norm possesses the highest status of
all international law,5 9 binds every State60 and endeavors to "protect the
fundamental values of all human life." 6 1 While there are efforts to add to the
list of jus cogens norms, 62 consensus exists for the peremptory status of
genocide, torture, aircraft hijacking, war crimes, the slave trade, and the
improvident use of force. 63 The jus cogens norm (and its qualifying conduct) derives from customary international law and, like it, exists somewhat
in the ether. 64 However, unlike customary international law, the existence of
the norm does not require State consent. 65 Moreover, unlike its customary
kin, the jus cogens norm applies even to the persistent objector. 66
Today there is increased interest in the idea of this norm. Recently, the
United Nations General Assembly appointed a Special Rapporteur, Dire
Tladi, to study the concept of jus cogens, and to issue a series of reports
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, openedfor signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). In general, courts seem
to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead in The PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900), regarding the elucidation of customary international law, to determine how to
identify a jus cogens norm. There, the Court opined that "where there is no treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators . . . ." Id. at 700. Pursuant to this approach, when determining
which norms have risen to the level of jus cogens, courts consider the works of other
courts and scholars. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-32; Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992); see generallyFlomo v. FirestoneNatural Rubber Co.,
643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2007); Floresv. Southern Peru CopperCorp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d

Cir. 2003).
59. Tladi, Second Report supra note 6, at 12-14.
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id. at 10.
62. See discussion infra, at n. 198.
63. See Bigio v. Coca Cola, 239 F.3d 440, 448 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting with
approval Rest. (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987)); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Reports 422, 457 (July 20).
64. Tladi, Second Report, supra note 6, at 22-23.
65. Id. at 14-15.
66. Id.
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documenting the origins, content, exercise, and enforcement of this norm. 6 7
To date, the Special Rapporteur has issued three reports, which discuss the
history and past uses of the norm, 68 the criteria for the norm, 69 and the
relationship of the norm to other sources and rules of international law. 70 In
one report he observed the norm's pride of place, stating that "the norms of
jus cogens protect the fundamental values of international law" 7 1 and that
"[t]his notion has never been seriously questioned." 72 Likewise, he reported
that "the view that jus cogens norms are hierarchically superior to other
rules and norms of international law is generally accepted." 7 3
Given the seriousness and the supremacy of the norm, historically, its
violation exposed the perpetrator to the exercise of universal jurisdiction on
the theory that the conduct was so abhorrent that it offended the family of
nations, thus allowing each of its members to hold the perpetrator accountable. 74 Universal jurisdiction, at least theoretically, can be imposed crimi67. United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, Sixty-

Eighth Session, First Report on Jus Cogens, Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, March 8,
2016, at 4 [hereinafter: Tladi, First Report]. The First Report noted that while many
States supported the effort to increase understanding of the jus cogens norm some
others questioned the propriety of this work altogether. The report observes that "[t]he
United States 'did not believe it would be productive for the [International Law] Commission to add the topic of jus cogens to its agenda.'" Id. at 5. It further observes that
France was unsure that the Commission could reach "consensus," and that the Netherlands did not see where States were in need of clarification on the norm. Id. However,
the report notes that "[m]any delegations reflected on the growth of jurisprudence on
the topic of jus cogens" and that "Finland, speaking on behalf of the Nordic States,
referred to decisions at both 'the international and national levels' invoking jus cogens."
Id. at 6.

68. 68. See generally Tladi, First Report, supra note 67.
69. 69. See generally Tladi, Second Report, supra note 6.
70. 70. See generally United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, Seventieth Session, Third Report on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, February 12, 2018.
71. Tladi, Second Report, supra note 6, at 10.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. at 14-15.
74. See Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens andSovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in ContemporaryJurisprudence, 46 GEO. I. INT'L L. 1151, 1154 (2015) (rec-

ognizing that "the doctrine of jus cogens is a product of the same tradition of
international law as the Nuremberg prosecutions that followed the Second World
War."); Anthony J. Colangelo, What is ExtraterritorialJurisdiction?, 19 CORNELL L.
REV. 1303, 1306-1307 (2014) (observing that "the concept of universal jurisdiction can
transform exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction into exercises of territorial jurisdiction
because U.S. courts are applying the substance of an international law that covers the
globe" and that "the international law of universal jurisdiction puts everyone every-
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Pursuant to the Restatement (Fourth) on Foreign

International law recognizes a state's jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to certain offenses of universal concern, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, certain acts of terrorism,
piracy, slave trade and torture, even if no specific connection exists
between the state and the persons or conduct being regulated. 76
This power arguably allows a State, for example, to apprehend an alleged perpetrator of a universal offense and hold them accountable in a
domestic criminal court.7 7 The Restatement further states that "universal jurisdiction as a matter of criminal law is well accepted under international
law"7 8 but that "the permissibility and limits of universal civil jurisdiction
remain controversial." 79
Indeed, while there are numerous examples of the exercise of universal
criminal jurisdiction, there are far fewer of its civil counterpart. However,
before Kiobel, many courts in the United States, exercised universal civil
jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.80 Despite this history, some
where on notice that they can be held to account anywhere for certain serious offenses
against international law-such as piracy, torture, genocide, and terrorist acts like hostage taking and plane bombing"); REST. (FOURTH) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 217 cmt. a
(noting that "a state may exercise such jurisdiction with respect to an offense committed
by a foreign national against a foreign national that took place outside its territory"); but
see Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars But Consistent with
InternationalTrends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1671, 1673 (2014) (observing that "Ki-

obel can be understood as not involving the extraterritoriality presumption, but rather its
more obscure cousin-the presumption against universality").
75. REST. (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 217 cmt. d.
76. 76. Rest. (Fourth) of Foreign Relations § 217.
77. See id. at § 217 cmt. b. International criminal tribunals may also seek to pursue such an offense upon the tribunal's charter or other international agreement. Id.
78. 78. Rest. (Fourth) of Foreign Relations § 217 cmt. d.
79. 79. Id.
80. 80. In Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995), the court opined
that although universal jurisdiction is usually a criminal exercise, international law also
allows for its civil expression under the ATS. Similarly, in Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman, the court stated that "states may exercise universal jurisdiction over
acts committed in violation of jus cogens norms." 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The court continued that "[t]his universal jurisdiction extends not merely to
criminal liability but may also extend to civil liability." See Ernest A. Young, Universal
Jurisdiction,the Alien Tort Statute, and TransnationalPublic-LawLitigation After Kiobel, 64 Duke L. J. 1023, 1029, 1033 (2015) (asserting that "the ATS amounts to a
uniquely American form of universal jurisdiction" and that "[u]niversal jurisdiction thus
counts on domestic courts to enforce principles of international law").

56

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have raised questions
about the scope of this license for fear that this expansive form of jurisdiction will frustrate comity. 8 ' This concern underlies the Court's decision in
Kiobel.82
A noble idea, borne of the desire of nations to tread lightly when their
interests intersect with those of sister nations, comity has become a touchstone for courts confronted with foreign-featured cases, especially universal
civil jurisdiction cases, typified by the pre-Kiobel ATS cases. 83 Indeed, the
Supreme Court deemed the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS necessary to "protect against unintended clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of other nations." 84 It repeated this theme
throughout Kiobel, further opining that "the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of
the ATS, because the question is not what Congress has done but what
courts may do." 8 5 The Court also expressed concern that the application of
the ATS to extraterritorial conduct could result in "other nations . . . applying the law of nations . . . [to] hale our citizens into their courts for alleged

violations of the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere
else in the world." 86 (As this article attempts to show, pursuant to universal
jurisdiction, this possibility already exists.)
81. 81. The Supreme Court has also underscored the primacy of comity when
determining the outer limits of general personal jurisdiction and the reach of a federal
statute. In DaimlerAG v. Bauman, concerning allegations of corporate complicity in the

human rights abuses during Argentina's "Dirty War," the Court opined that the
"[United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit] . . . paid little heed to the risks
to international comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed." 571 U.S. 117
(2013).
82. 82. See generallyKiobel, 569 U.S. 108. The Court also raises the comity issue
in Jesner but, as noted above, decides the case on other grounds.
83. Comity also provides a respectable explanation for a court's refusal to exercise
the jurisdiction that it lawfully possesses. According to scholar William S. Dodge, over
time the concept of comity has splintered into numerous principles-e.g., "prescriptive
comity" ("deference to foreign lawmakers"), "adjudicative comity" ("deference to foreign courts") and "sovereign party comity" ("deference to foreign governments as litigants"). International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2099
(2015). This complexity has served to confuse some courts and forestall some arguments. Nonetheless, most likely few would argue against the propriety of a court considering comity when asked to adjudicate a matter with significant foreign features.
84. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115-16 (quoting EEOC v. ArabianAmerican Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 124. The Court reiterates this point, regarding the perceived vulnerability

of corporations, in Jesner. See 138 S. Ct. at 1405-1406.
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Additionally, many years before Kiobel, Justice Breyer, in his Sosa
concurrence, expressed apprehension about the possibility of ATS litigation
"undermin[ing] the very harmony that it was intended to promote."87 He
noted that, in the foreign-cubed case, comity issues are especially prevalent.
However, quite importantly, he opined that the prosecution of offenses that
are subject to universal jurisdiction are inherently compliant with international comity,8 8 observing that "[t]he fact that this procedural consensus exists suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited
set of norms is consistent with principles of international comity." 89 Moreover, he opined that:
[A]llowing every nation's courts to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly threaten
the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That
consensus concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction . . . suggests that universal tort jurisdiction
would be no more threatening.90
A categorical bar by the Court against the exercise of universal civil
jurisdiction, on the ground that it thwarts comity, would starkly conflict
with Justice Breyer's stated belief about the relationship between these two
aspects of international law. This article contends that the Court did not go
this far when it recognized that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applied to the ATS and conduct relevant to the ATS claim must touch and
concern the United States for ATS jurisdiction to lie. The Court assertedly
did, however, speak to these matters out of a concern for comity, and indeed there is certainly evidence of foreign State pushback to the exercise of
ATS jurisdiction.
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of such resistance-even disdainto the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS is South
Africa. South African President Thabo Mbeki objected to this jurisdiction
in In Re South African Apartheid Litigation, a group of ATS cases filed
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
88. Id.
89. 89. Id. at 762.
90. Id. (citing REST. (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 cmt. b (1987)) (emphasis added). But what a difference ten years makes. At no point in Kiobel did Justice

Breyer, in his concurrence, or Justice Roberts, in his majority opinion, identify the underlying offenses as of universal concern (despite that they included torture) to say the

least warranting of ATS jurisdiction, indicating that such a claim must do more for
jurisdiction under the ATS. Perhaps an allegation of direct liability against a natural
person would suffice.
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against a spate of corporate actors and others for allegedly aiding and abetting the South African apartheid regime, resulting in the torture and extrajudicial killing of South Africans. 9' In a letter to the court, Mr. Mbeki made it
very clear that South Africa, as a sovereign State, had a right to determine
the resolution of claims resulting from its apartheid era in a way and place
that it saw fit.92 That way was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
and that place South Africa. Notably, this letter gives no quarter to universal jurisdiction as generally conceived at international law. Numerous other
States have expressed their opposition to the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in the United States. Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom regularly oppose such jurisdiction when exercised in ATS
cases. 93

However, comity was, in fact, the reason that Congress passed the
ATS, 94 and it might require the exercise rather than the rejection of jurisdiction. 95 Indeed, some foreign sovereigns have so requested. In Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, a foreign-cubed matter which concerned allegations of aiding and
abetting torture, the Papua New Guinea Government assented to the exercise of ATS jurisdiction 96 after first contesting it.9 The Bolivian Government behaved similarly in Mamani v. Berzain, another foreign-cubed case,
concerning alleged extrajudicial killings committed by former Bolivian
government officials against political protestors. 98 Courts should not, then,
assume comity issues in ATS cases, even those with foreign-cubed claims. 99
91. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 299 (2d Cir. 2007).
92. Id.
93. Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (No. 10-1491); Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 569 U.S. 108 (No. 10-1491); Brief of the
Governments of the United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Commonwealth of Australia as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants, Rio Tinto v. Sarei, 569 U.S. 945 (2013) (Nos. 09-56381, 02-56256,
02-56390).
94. See discussion infra at 15-16.
95. 95. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
96. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 757 (judgment vacated by Rio Tinto v. Sarei, 569 U.S. 945
(2013)).
97. Id.
98. Mamani v. Berzain, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

99. In two foreign-squared cases, with overwhelmingly foreign features, the State
where the direct injury occurred also consented to the exercise of ATS jurisdiction. The
South African government of Joseph Zuma, who assumed the presidency immediately
after Thabo Mbeki, consented to ATS jurisdiction in the expansive apartheid litigation
in the United States. Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, at
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The exercise of ATS jurisdiction over claims of direct violation of a
jus cogens norm against a natural person should further alleviate comity
issues because the alleged offense is severe, the connection between that
offense and the alleged offender is close, and the offense is upon each State.
Moreover, the State where the relevant conduct literally occurred might
identify less with a defendant that is not a corporation' 00 and thus intertwined with the business of the State.
Some scholars believe that in Kiobel the Supreme Court abolished universal civil jurisdiction in United States courts and that it did so out of
0
This article contends that courts should not read Kiobel
comity concerns.o'
as having this effect on all universal claims nor opine that all ATS claims
raise forbidding foreign relations issues. Neither in Kiobel nor in RJR
Nabisco did the Court per se prohibit foreign-cubed cases where the plaintiff alleges direct liability for ajus cogens violation against a natural person.
Moreover, this article suggests that the seriousness of the jus cogens claim,
its implications at international law, and reduced comity risk warrant an
express dictate from the Court if it deems these claims beyond the reach of
the ATS. Without this clarity, lower courts should not deny ATS jurisdiction on the ground that the relevant conduct giving rise to the jus cogens
violation did not occur in the territorial United States. The courts should, in
essence, treat these cases the way some courts did before Kiobel; they
should, when appropriate, allow the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction.

1I.

PRE-KOBEL CASES

The ATS was enacted in 1789, as a part of the First Judiciary Act of
the United States Congress,1 02 to protect foreign relations and to hold to
account the "enemy of all mankind," the pirate, and anyone who would
harbor him.1 03 As others have observed, the statute "lay dormant" for
¶ 3, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013), (Nos. 09-2778-cv, 09-2779cv, 09-2780-cv, 09-2781-cv, 09-2783-cv, 09-2785-cv, 09-2787-cv, 09-2792-cv, 092801-cv, 09-3037-cv.) (Germany, the home State of some of the defendants in this case,
continued to oppose the exercise of ATS jurisdiction.) Likewise, the Ecuadorian government also consented to ATS jurisdiction in Jota v. Texaco Inc., which concerned
allegations of environmental degradation and related personal injuries by Texaco in
Ecuador. 157 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1998).
100. This is not at all to say that corporations should not be subject to ATS
jurisdiction.
101. See discussion infra at 21-22.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
103. Id. This statute was spawned, in part, by congressional concern over the possible inability of the United States to provide legal redress to a French ambassador who
was assaulted on United States soil and a Dutch ambassador whose domestic servant
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roughly 200 years 04 until it was resuscitated by Filartiga.05 The first case
of its kind, Filartigaaccomplished two key things. It clarified that torture is
a violation of customary international law 06 and suggested the correctness
of recognizing ATS jurisdiction despite that the parties were foreign and the
signal event occurred in a foreign State. 07 (Indeed, the FilartigaCourt held
that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationalityof the parties"0 and that "whenever an alleged
torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders,
Section 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.").09
Before Kiobel it was not uncommon for plaintiffs, like those in Filartiga, to seek ATS jurisdiction premised on direct liability claims against
natural persons. These claims were generally foreign-cubed, with little to no
connection to the territory of the United States. Frequently, they also concerned ajus cogens violation. Given the severity of the claim and the model
created by Filartiga, courts were wont to recognize ATS jurisdiction. In
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the recognition of ATS jurisdiction"t0 where the
plaintiff, an Ethiopian national, alleged that an Ethiopian government official "tortured and interrogated [her] for several hours.""' The plaintiff further alleged that this official supervised and "participated directly""1 2 in
some of the torture, which included whipping her on her legs and back
while she was naked and bound.11 3 Additionally, she alleged that all of
these events occurred in Ethiopia. 114
was arrested after a New York official, without privilege, entered the ambassador's
home in the United States. As a result of these specific incidents the statute was principally concerned, at its creation, with infringements on the rights of ambassadors and
violations of safe conduct, as well as piracy, a signal challenge of the day.
104. Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1773, 1774 (2014); see
also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1609, 1637 (2014).
105. Filartiga,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

106. Id. at 884.
107. Id. at 878.
108. Id. (emphasis added).

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 846.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845-46.
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Similarly, in Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia also recognized jurisdiction where the
plaintiffs, Bosnia-Herzegovina nationals, sued a soldier in the Bosnian Serb
Army, alleging that the soldier tortured them while they were detained,
without charge, at a police station in Bosanski Samac." 5 The court noted
that "[the plaintiff] was beaten with batons and then with a baseball bat ...
forced to spread his legs and . . . beaten on his genitals."11 6 Additionally, the
court observed that the defendant kicked the plaintiff in the face, disfiguring
him and "causing him to be unable to eat for 10 days."'"7 The court further
concluded that ATS jurisdiction was proper because "official torture" violates customary international law." 8 As these two cases show, in this preKiobel era, courts were willing to recognize ATS jurisdiction over foreigncubed claims against a natural person alleging direct liability for a jus
cogens violation.
During this time, courts were also willing to recognize ATS jurisdiction over a claim that alleged indirect liability for ajus cogens breach, such
as torture. In In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deemed ATS jurisdiction appropriate where the plaintiffs sued the estate of former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, and his daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotec, for
aiding and abetting the torture and wrongful death of a Philippine national.11 9 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in this conduct
in the Philippines, "pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos." 1 20 In
reaching its decision the court opined that "the prohibition against official
torture 'carries with it the force of ajus cogens norm,' which 'enjoy[s] the
highest status within international law.' "121
Similarly, in another suit against the estate of former President
Marcos, the Ninth Circuit again concluded that ATS jurisdiction was proper
115. Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32.
116.
117.
118.
119.
1992).
120.
121.

Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1344-45.
In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 495, 503 (9th Cir.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 500 (quoting Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715) (internal citation omitted).

Siderman is a seminal case on the formation and authority of jus cogens norms. Its
discussion about the hierarchy of these norms demonstrates some of the decision's pedagogical value: "[T]he supremacy of jus cogens extends over all rules of international
law; norms that have attained the status of jus cogens 'prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them.'"
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716 (quoting REST. (THIRD) FOREIGN REL. § 102 cmt. k (1987)).
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where the plaintiffs alleged aiding and abetting liability for torture.1 22 In
reaching its conclusion the court observed that during the Marcos administration "up to 10,000 people in the Philippines were allegedly tortured, summarily executed or disappeared at the hands of military intelligence
personnel acting pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos." 2 3
Also, in Xuncax v. Gramajo, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts recognized ATS jurisdiction1 2 4 where nine Guatemalan nationals sued a former official of the Guatemalan government for
aiding and abetting torture, summary execution and forced disappearance,
amongst other claims.1 2 5 The plaintiffs alleged that all of the subject acts
occurred in Guatemala.1 26 In reaching its decision the court noted the significance of Filartigaand non-derogable norms, stating that the ATS is designed to address acts "perpetrated by hostis humani generis ('enemies of
all mankind') in contravention of jus cogens (peremptory norms of international law)." 2 7
Finally, in Paul v. Avril, a magistrate for the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida recognized ATS jurisdiction
where six Haitian nationals sued another Haitian national, a military leader,
for events that occurred in Haiti.1 28 The plaintiffs alleged aiding and abetting liability for torture, amongst other acts-including dragging, beating,
withholding medical treatment, and starvation-that occurred in Haiti.1 29
They specifically alleged that they were subject to these acts upon defendant's "order, approval, instigation, and knowledge" 30 and that "[n]one of
the acts enunciated are alleged to have been committed by [the defendant]

himself."'31
In each of these cases, the courts cited to Filartiga,in some way, when
analyzing the soundness of ATS jurisdiction. This seminal case's impact on
early ATS cases, particularly those that alleged a jus cogens violation, was
profound. This article suggests the continued viability of this pioneering
case, despite the recent narrowing of ATS jurisdiction, because neither Ki122. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.

1994).
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1469.
See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 189.
Id. at 169-71.
Id.

127. Id. at 183.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
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obel nor RJR Nabisco reach claims of direct liability for ajus cogens violation against a natural person, the prototypical Filartiga-typeclaim.
III.

KIOBEL

Kiobel, like most other ATS cases against a corporation, concerned an
allegation of indirect liability for a jus cogens violation.1 3 2 The plaintiffs,
residents of Nigeria's Ogoniland, alleged that Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Shell Transport and Trading Company, and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (collectively "Shell"), aided and abetted the
Nigerian government in committing torture, amongst other atrocities,
against them.1 33 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case by
the Second Circuit, concluding that no conduct relevant to the ATS claim
occurred in the United States.1 3 4 It specifically stated:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that
mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine oth35
erwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.'
In reaching this decision the Court did not seem to consider the significance of a claim alleging indirect versus direct liability, a claim alleging a
tort against a juridical versus a natural person, or a claim alleging a violation of a non-peremptory versus a peremptory or jus cogens norm.1 36
The Court seemed to consider only the character of the claim before
it-the foreign-cubed claim-with little to no connection to the United
States, alleging the aiding and abetting of a law of nations violation (including jus cogens) against a corporation. Pursuant to Kiobel, such a claim, it
appears, cannot sustain ATS jurisdiction.3 7 Both the Court's holding and
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion reveal the justices' focus on the scope
of the ATS when applied to corporatedefendants. As noted, at the end of
132. See generally Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 124. The Second Circuit, however, dismissed the case on the ground
that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over corporations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). Jesner, of
course, affirms the view that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See 138 S. Ct. at 1407.
135. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264-73).
136. See generally Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108.
137. Id. at 125.

64

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

the opinion, after providing the touch and concern language, the Court
stated, "Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices [to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality].
If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than
the ATS would be required." 3 8 That these are the last words of the opinion,1 39 rather than some broader, more abstract, or theoretical language
about the definitive reach of the ATS, furthers the notion that the Kiobel
holding was largely about the instant facts before the Court-regarding the
extraterritorial reach of the statute when corporations are sued pursuant to
ATS jurisdiction-and little more.1 4 0 (That is not in the least to say that to
the Court the question of United States nexus would be immaterial when
the defendant is a natural person).
Because of the specific facts in Kiobel and the Court's fact-specific
holding, it is unclear whether the holding precludes ATS jurisdiction over a
foreign-cubed claim alleging the aiding and abetting of a law of nations
violation (whether of a jus cogens norm or not) against a natural person.
The appropriate effect of Kiobel on this kind of claim is not apparent because the only difference between this claim and the kind of claim brought
in Kiobel is the type of defendant. That said, the Kiobel holding significantly focuses on corporations. Consequently, the difference in type of defendant may be a dispositive one. It seems far clearer, though, that Kiobel
did not preclude ATS jurisdiction over the foreign-cubed claim where the
plaintiff alleges direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural
person.
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs, Nigerian nationals, alleged that Shell should
be held liable for torture and crimes against humanity, amongst other
claims, because it "provid[ed]the Nigerian forces with food, transportation,
and compensation, as well as . . . allow[ed] the Nigerian military to use
[Shell's] property as a staging ground for attacks."l 4 1 In virtually every way
the Court seemed compelled by the notion of distance in these facts: (1)
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Some of Justice Breyer's language reinforces the conclusion that the Kiobel
holding principally concerned corporate defendants. He stated:
Under these circumstances, even if the New York office were a sufficient basis for

asserting general jurisdiction . . . it would be farfetched to believe, based solely
upon the defendants' minimal and indirect American presence, that this legal action helps to vindicate a distinct American interest, such as in not providing a safe
harbor for an "enemy of all mankind."

Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 113-114 (emphasis added).
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distance of the defendants to the plaintiffs' harm; (2) distance of the plaintiffs' injury to the forum State; and (3) distance of the plaintiffs themselves
to the forum. These features, arguably, would not be present with the claim
of direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural person.
First, because the plaintiff would be alleging direct liability for the
violation, there would be no distance between the defendant and the plaintiff's harm. Second, because the alleged harm would be ajus cogens violation, it would be considered an offense against every State. 14 2 Third,
because the alleged harm would be a jus cogens violation, every State has
an interest in prosecuting the perpetrator regardless of the nationality of the
plaintiff. Moreover, as shown, pre-Kiobel, an allegation of ajus cogens violation, for some courts, was a legal show-stopper given that such an offense
is considered among the most egregious known to humankind and that, as
such, international law authorizes every State to confer jurisdiction-indisputably criminal and theoretically civill 4 3 -over the alleged offender. Accordingly, there is nothing in Kiobel that should prevent this result today
when the claim alleges direct liability against a natural person for a jus
cogens violation.144 Kiobel simply did not speak to these allegations. Regardless, these allegations, by definition, touch and concern every State
given the nature of the jus cogens norm and the significance of its breach at
international law.1 45 Many courts, however, have concluded that the Kiobel
holding commands one outcome if the claim at issue is foreign-cubed, regardless of any different treatment warranted by the class of the defendant,
the type of harm, or the nature of the liability. (In his Kiobel concurrence,
Justice Breyer noted the relevance of the distinction between the categories
of liability when concluding that the facts of Kiobel were insufficient for a
finding of ATS jurisdiction, observing that "the plaintiffs allege, not that the
defendants directly engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or the equivalent,
but that they helped others . . . to do so.").146

142. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715 ("In the words of the International Court of Justice, these norms, which include 'principles and rules concerning the basic human rights
of the human person,' are the concern of all states; 'they are obligations erga omnes.'")
(quoting The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment,
1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb. 5)).
143. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
144. This argument also likely applies to the juridical person defendant.

145. See Colangelo, supra note 74, at 1327 ("Indeed . . . the exercise of universal
jurisdiction is not really extraterritorial; rather, it is the decentralized enforcement by

domestic courts of an international law that covers the globe.") (citation omitted).
146. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).

66

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 24

POST-KIOBEL CASES

After Kiobel was decided many scholars pronounced the death of universal jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. Professor Wallach stated that the
case "brought to an end the thirty-year experiment lower federal courts had
been conducting with universal civil jurisdiction under the ATS"1 4 7 and that
"Kiobel leaves no doubt that courts cannot apply federal law to claims
under the ATS unless there is a sufficiently strong connection between the
United States and the conduct forming the basis for the alleged torts." 4 8
Similarly, Professor Ku asserted that "both the opinion for the Court by
Chief Justice John Roberts and the main concurring opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer refused to interpret the ATS as authorizing universal jurisdiction." 4 9 Additionally, Professor Altholtz said that "[i]n Kiobel, the Supreme
Court majority rejected [the idea that the ATS provided universal jurisdiction] and narrowed U.S. court jurisdiction to suits that 'touch and concern'
50
U.S. interests."o
Professor Kontorovich also suggested that the "retrench5
ment"1 ' reflected in Kiobel was predictable given international law
trends 52 and opined that "Kiobel is the next major step in a broad disengagement from [universal jurisdiction] by leading Western nations." 53
However, others considered where the ATS might still have capacity
to vindicate human rights abuses. Professor Stephens asserted that Justice
Breyer's opinion-offering various ways that an ATS claim could touch
and concern the United States-might suggest a way "forward." 54 She also
observed that "[t]he Supreme Court's narrow holding in Kiobel should not
bar claims against U.S. corporations or claims against foreign corporations
147. 147. David Wallach, The Irrationality of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 46
GEO. J. INT'L

L. 803, 828 (2015).

148. Id.
149. Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 835, 835 (2013).
150. Roxana Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Future of U.S. Human
Rights Litigation Post-Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2014).
151. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with InternationalTrends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2014).
152. Id. (observing that "[u]niversal jurisdiction, which had seemed an ascendant
law doctrine in the 1990s, has in the past decade encountered a significant backlash,
leading ultimately to its destabilization and retrenchment").
153. Id.
154. Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1467, 1541 (2014) ("Viewed as an elaboration of the issues raised by
Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion could inform application of a
Sosa-Kiobel ATS standard going forward.").
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with substantial ties to the United States." 15 Additionally, Professors Curran and Sloss proposed legislation to resolve the issues posed by ATS jurisdiction but also to provide access to a remedy for those who need the

jurisdiction most.1 56
The debate about the reach of the statute continues. In its midst are
courts strictly circumscribing this reach. Few of those courts consider the
significance of ATS jurisdiction premised on allegations of direct liability
for ajus cogens violation against a natural person. Many dismiss forthwith
ATS claims with these features, according them no legal value whatsoever.
Quite the contrary, to a substantial degree, the cases post-Kiobel (and postRJR Nabisco) demonstrate that many courts are applying a test to ATS
claims that facially precludes appropriate consideration of Filartiga-type
claims. When confronted with the question of ATS propriety, these courts
apply Kiobel's touch and concern test. In the doing, they determine whether
any relevant conduct 57 occurred in the territorial United States. If it did,
they allow ATS jurisdiction. If it did not, they disallow it. Many courts take
this approach-privileging territoriality-without any express requirement
in Kiobel to do so. These courts do not consider liability, defendant, nor
norm differentials.
In Warfaa v. Ali, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit provides the paradigmatic example of a court's improvident dismissal of an ATS claim pursuant to the theory that relevant conduct must occur
in the territorial United States to sustain ATS jurisdiction.158 A foreign-cubed case, Warfaa concerned an allegation of direct liability for torture
against a natural person. Indeed, the plaintiff and the defendant were Somali
nationals and the events that gave rise to the plaintiff's injury occurred in
Somalia.1 5 9 The court, thus, affirmed the district court's dismissal of this
claim on the ground that the claim did not "touch[] and concern[ ]" the
United States sufficient to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality.1 60
155. Beth Stephens, Extraterritorialityand Human Rights After Kiobel, 28 MD. J.
INT'L

L. 256, 274 (2013).

156. Vivian Grosswald Curran & David Sloss, Reviving Human Rights Litigation
After Kiobel, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 862 (2013) ("We propose a statutory private right
of action to enable genocide victims to file civil tort actions against any perpetrators
whom prosecutors have charged with genocide or related offenses.").
157. Many courts have determined the presence or absence of relevant conduct
without inquiry into the focus of the ATS. Other courts have attempted to define the
focus as safely and predictably as possible.
158. Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661 (4th Cir. 2016).
159. Id. at 656.
160. Id. at 661.
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The court reflexively applied Kiobel in reaching this conclusion.161 In
the process, it used a version of the touch and concern test not articulated by
the Supreme Court in Kiobel. The court stated that "[a] plaintiff may rebut
the presumption in certain narrow circumstances: when extensive United
States contacts are present and the alleged conduct bears such a strong and
direct connection to the United States that it falls within Kiobel's limited
'touch and concern language.' "162 In Kiobel the Supreme Court never spoke
of "contacts" when speaking about this test. The use of that word suggests
that the Court requires an actual, literal, physical connection to the United
States for the test to be met. If this is what the Court meant, it did not say it
in Kiobel (Admittedly, there is now a stronger argument to make that RJR
Nabisco requires this test but this article still contends otherwise.). The significance of the Fourth Circuit's misunderstanding of the touch and concern
test is that this misapprehension prevented the court from seeing other ways
that the claim implicated the United States.
As discussed above, a jus cogens violation affects every State. The
Warfaa Court, though, failed to consider the significance of the jus cogens
claim before it. The plaintiff sought ATS jurisdiction pursuant to his allegation of a direct commission of such a violation.' 63 To wit, the plaintiff alleged that an officer in the Somali government, along with others, tortured
him by beating him multiple times,'1" shooting him in the wrist and leg,1 65
and then leaving him for dead.' 66 That the alleged torture occurred in
Somalia 67 should not have resulted in summary dismissal of his ATS claim
given that ajus cogens violation anywhere is as good as ajus cogens violation everywhere. That is the nature of the tort. Accordingly, the court
should have considered the import of the plaintiff's jus cogens claim within
the context of the plaintiff's request for ATS jurisdiction.1 6 8 The court
161. Id. at 662-63 (Gregory, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, correctly observed that the instant case was distinguishable from Kiobel because there was a safe
harbor issue and the matter concerned a natural person and not a corporation. It additionally noted that "[b]lithely relying on the fact that the human rights abuses occurred
abroad ignores the myriad ways in which this claim touches and concerns the territory
of the United States." Id. at 663.
162. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 656-57. As well, the court did not consider prevention of safe harbor as
one of the bases for recognizing ATS jurisdiction.
164. Id. at 656.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 660-61.
168. See also id. at 662 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (observing that "no circuit court
has decided a post-Kiobel ATS case premised on principal liability brought against an
individual defendant who has sought safe haven in the United States, a key difference
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should have also considered the implications of the plaintiff's allegation of
direct (rather than indirect) liability against a natural (rather than juridical)
person.
Similarly, in Jara v. Nunez, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the ground
that all of the relevant conduct occurred abroad. 169 There, the plaintiff sued
a member of General Augusto Pinochet's army for torture and extrajudicial
killing.1 70 According to the complaint, "Defendant ordered his subordinates
to torture [the plaintiff's decedent] and then 'personally subjected [him] to
the game of Russian roulette, putting [him] in fear of his life' and ultimately
72
killing him."1 71 The decedent and the defendant were Chilean nationals
73
and the shooting occurred in Chile.1 The court did not consider the significance of the plaintiff's claim of direct liability against a natural person for a
jus cogens violation.
Likewise, in Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim brought
pursuant to the ATS because all of the relevant conduct occurred overseas.1 74 There, the plaintiffs, Indian nationals, alleged that another Indian
national, amongst others, committed grave human rights abuses against
them, all in the territory of India.' 75 The court agreed with the rejection of
ATS jurisdiction despite the plaintiffs' claim of direct liability for a jus
cogens violation.1 76
the majority does not address" and that "the analysis and relevant considerations may
differ where the defendant is a natural person").
169. Jara v. Nunez, No. 6:13-cv-1426-Orl-378GJK, 2015 WL 12852354, at *4,
(M.D. Fla. April 14, 2015) ("Kiobel forecloses all of Plaintiffs' ATS claims because the
tortious conduct took place entirely outside the United States. Though Kiobel provides

for some possible extraterritorial application of the ATS, the wholly foreign conduct
here . . . simply does not 'touch and concern' the United States with such force as to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.") (citations omitted).
170. Id.

171. Id. at *2 (emphasis in original).
172. Id. at *3-*4. However, by the time that the court decided the question of ATS
jurisdiction, the defendant was a United States citizen.
173. Id. at *4.
174. Sikhs for Just. Inc. v. Nath, 596 Fed. Appx. 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2014).
175. See generally Sikhs for Just. Inc., 596 Fed. Appx. 7.
176. Id. at 9. Additionally, in Fotso v. Cameroon, No. 6:12 CV 1415-TC. 2013

WL 3006338, *7, (D. Or. June 11, 2013), the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, dismissed a plaintiffs torture claim against a public official, brought
pursuant to the ATS. The parties were all Cameroon nationals and the underlying conduct occurred in Cameroon. However, the plaintiff alleged a direct jus cogens offense
against a natural person. This notwithstanding, the court dismissed the matter with great
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These cases show that, when resolving the question of ATS jurisdiction, some courts do not consider the import of claims that allege a jus
cogens violation, direct liability, or a natural person offender. Four years
after deciding Kiobel, the Court decided RJR Nabisco, which, among other
things, regarded the general approach that a court should follow when considering the extraterritorial application of a statute.1 77 The decision, however, offers little, if anything, to clarify the substantive and geographic
reach of the ATS.
V.

RJR

NABISCO

The European Community (EC) sued RJR Nabisco, in a United States
court, under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
on the ground that the company had engaged in a complex money laundering scheme involving cigarette sales in the European Union (EU). 78 The
EC sought to apply RICO to alleged conduct that occurred in the EU.1 79 In
determining whether the statute applied extraterritorially, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that it must apply the following two-step
framework:
At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted-that is, whether the statute gives a clear,
affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. We must ask
this question regardless of whether the statute in question regulates
conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If the statute is
not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the
case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by
looking to the statute's "focus." If the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a
permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred
abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign
country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S.
territory. 8 0
The Court cited its holding in Kiobel when it enunciated this
scheme.' 8 ' The significance of the framework to ATS cases, however, is
dispatch, noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied and that
"[a]ccordingly, plaintiff concedes his claims against the individual defendants."
177. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2090.
178. Id. at 2098.
179. Id. at 2097-98.
180. Id. at 2101.
181. Id.

2017-2018]

The Whole Wide World

71

unclear but potentially substantial. Kiobel disposed of any ambiguity regarding whether the plain language of the statute evidences congressional
intent that it apply extraterritorially. 18 2 According to the Court, it does not.
So, the issue for ATS claims is not Step 1 but rather Step 2-and Step 2
offers little to direct the court seized with a claim brought pursuant to the
statute. Because the Supreme Court has yet to identify the "focus" of the
ATS or the requisite character, kind, and quantum of conduct that is relevant to that focus, the language in Step 2 suggests nothing regarding the
conduct that might pass jurisdictional muster. Moreover, Step 2 is subject to
more than one interpretation. It might mean that ATS jurisdiction is proper
if relevant conduct occurred in the United States and nowhere else; or, that
ATS jurisdiction is proper if relevant conduct occurred in the United States
despite that it might have also occurred in a foreign State; or, ATS jurisdiction is not proper if relevant conduct occurred in a foreign State even if
relevant conduct also occurred in the United States. Further, it is anyone's
guess what any of these interpretations mean to the foreign-cubed jus
cogens claim alleging direct liability against a natural person.
There are additional key questions about the reach of the ATS that
neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco answer. Both Justice Kennedy's and Justice
Breyer's concurrences in Kiobel speak to the possibility of ATS jurisdiction
being appropriate under circumstances not considered by the Court in the
majority opinion. Importantly, their opinions suggest that the emphasis that
the Kiobel majority opinion placed on relevant conduct in the United States
might not be appropriate for all ATS cases. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy observed that the Court left "open a number of significant questions
regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute"1 83 and that
"[o]ther cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases [not] covered . . . by the
reasoning and holding of today's case." 1 84 He further opined that in those
cases "the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial
85
Simiapplication may require some further elaboration and explanation."
larly, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that the Kiobel opinion did
not answer the requisite question of precisely when the ATS can be applied
extraterritorially and that, instead, "[i]t leaves for another day the determination of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be
'overcome. '"186
182. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117.
183. Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 131-32.
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Justice Kennedy, however, joined the majority opinion in RJR
Nabisco. Given his observations in Kiobel, revealing an understanding
about the nuances in ATS cases, it is difficult to see how he would agree to
a reading of the ATS that would completely bar jurisdiction unless relevant
conduct occurred in the territorial United States, as one reading of the twostep framework would require.18 7 Perhaps more plausible is that Justice
Kennedy does not read Step 2 in the RJR Nabisco framework as strictly as
others might.188 More specifically, Justice Kennedy's presence in the RJR
Nabisco Majority might mean that the Court did not intend for Step 2 to
preclude jurisdiction over every claim brought pursuant to the ATS that
lacks relevant conduct in the territorial United States.
This article suggests that neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco strictly foreclose ATS jurisdiction premised on direct liability of a natural person for a
jus cogens claim. However, if courts read Step 2 to require relevant conduct
in the territorial United States, then Step 2 will foreclose this kind of claim.

VI.

POST-RJR NABISCO CASES

Because RJR Nabisco was fairly recently decided, very few commentators to date have published about its significance to ATS cases. In one of
the few works that engage this question, Professor Swaine underscores that
RJR Nabisco evidences the Court's increased focus on "territoriality"-as
opposed to extraterritoriality-when determining the reach of a U.S. statute.' 89 Similarly, in his work, Professor Gevurtz observes that, with RJR
Nabisco, the Court made it more difficult to seek redress "under federal law
for injuries suffered abroad." 90 Certainly these are facts about the case with
which ATS plaintiffs must contend.
187. See id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His Kiobel concurrence was brief
and somewhat cryptic so what, if anything, it, in fact, presaged is certainly subject to
another interpretation.
188. See, e.g., Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184.
189. Edward T. Swaine, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality:Here, (Not) There, (Not

Even) Everywhere, 69

OKLA.

L.

REV.

23, 25 (2016) ("Unsurprisingly, given its title, this

Article puts a heavy emphasis on territoriality-not, it should be stressed, as a matter of
normative preference, but purely as a reflection of the Court's recent cases. It is accord-

ingly inconsistent with some of the more expansive readings of the ATS, though it stops
short of Justice Alito's prescription.").
190. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Building A Wall Against PrivateActions for Overseas
Injuries: The Impact of RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2016) ("In perhaps another skirmish between the forces of globalization and those who want to fence the world out, Justice Alito in RJR Nabisco v. European Community . . . raised the presumption against extraterritoriality into a
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In the two cases post-RJR Nabisco that, to date, deal substantively with
the ATS, Adhikari v. Kellogg, Brown & Root,191 and Salim v. Mitchell,19 2
the courts indeed privilege territoriality. In Adhikari,1 93 the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant was directly liable for forced labor and human trafficking
in Iraq.1 9 4 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
applied RJR Nabisco's two-step framework. It opined that, at Step 2, "[i]f
we conclude that the record is devoid of any domestic activity relevant to
Plaintiffs' claims, our analysis is complete: as in Kiobel, the presumption
against extraterritoriality bars the action." 95 But, as stated above, Step 2 of
the framework lends itself to more than one reading and this court's is just
one. Nonetheless, compelled by a strict interpretation of RJR Nabisco, the
court looked for U.S.-based conduct that reached the level of "relevant"
and, finding none,1 9 6 affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ATS
claim (this, despite the defendant's status as a United States corporation).
Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs alleged "direct liability
for the tort of human trafficking and forced labor"' 97-which some authorities view as jus cogens violations' 98-it accorded no legal significance to
the heinousness of the alleged offenses or the alleged direct commission of
them by the defendant.
By contrast, the dissent observed that Step 2 of the framework "leaves
open the questions of how to interpret the focus, and how courts should
proceed when there is potentially relevant conduct both within and outside
the United States." 99 The dissent also recognized the significance of "the
nature of the defendant's liability (director indirect)200 as well as the signifsubstantially greater barrier against those seeking relief under federal law for injuries
suffered abroad.").
191. Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184.
192. Salim, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (2017).
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See generally Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 195 (citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 108 (2013)).
See generally Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184.
Id. at 197.
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners,697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2009)

("It is apparent from the findings of both judicial and academic authorities, discussed
later in this Memorandum and Order, that human trafficking and forced labor, whether
committed by states or private individuals, have been recognized as violations of jus
cogens norms, and therefore fall within the jurisdictional grant of the ATS."); Doe v.
Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), on reh'g en banc sub nom. Doe v. Unocal,

403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[F]orced labor is so widely condemned that it has
achieved the status of a jus cogens violation.").

199. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 208 (Graves, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (emphasis in original).
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icance of the "type of violation alleged," 20 1 in determining the propriety of
ATS jurisdiction. It deemed these inquiries vital, "above and beyond necessary allegations of relevant conduct occurring in the United States." 202
In Salim, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington, like the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari, focused on territoriality and
recognized ATS jurisdiction in the matter before it. There, the court considered allegations of direct liability against natural persons for torture. The
plaintiffs specifically alleged that defendants "designed, implemented, and
personally administered an experimental torture program for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency," 203 which caused the plaintiffs' extreme injuries.
The court concluded that the "focus test" did not apply but that, even if it
did, the allegations would satisfy. 204 The court did apply Kiobel's touch and
concern test, finding it met given that the defendants, two psychologists,
were U.S. nationals and conducted much of their work on U.S. territory. 205
While each of these decisions concerned allegations of torture, neither
meaningfully acknowledged that torture is ajus cogens violation. As a consequence, neither determined the legal significance of this fact. Instead, the
court in Adhikari considered the location of relevant conduct strictly, as
many courts did after Kiobel, irrespective of the gravity of the inquiry concerned, and, accordingly, did not deem ATS jurisdiction appropriate because no "relevant conduct" occurred in the territorial United States. The
court in Salim deeply contemplated the seriousness of the claims of torture-albeit without evaluating them within the context of jus cogens. The
court sustained ATS jurisdiction because the defendants were U.S. nationals
and engaged in conduct on U.S. territory. Each of these courts, though, had
an opportunity to discuss the significance of ajus cogens violation and the
directness of the claim of liability and neither pursued it.

VII.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY CASES

There is a line of cases, however, that fully contemplates the allegation
of a jus cogens violation. These cases hold that even an allegation of indirect liability for this breach is so significant that it can strip a foreign offi20 1. Id.
202. Id.
203. Salim, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. ("As to ATS jurisdiction, the legal landscape
is evolving, but this court finds the touch and concern test of Kiobel and Doe I v. Nestle,
766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014), to be the appropriate and controlling standard.").
204. Id. at 1161 ("The court does not agree with the formulation of the 'focus
test' as presented by the Fifth and Second Circuit cases . .. but if required to utilize the
focus inquiry, the court would find it met.").
205. See id. at 1153.
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cial of prosecutorial immunity. In Yousuf v. Samantar, Somali nationals
sued a former senior official of the Somali government for torture, extrajudicial killing, and other acts, and sought jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. 20 6
The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to the acts "by government
agents under the command and control of [the defendant] ."207 They did not
allege that the defendant directly committed these acts. The defendant contended that he was protected by common law immunities 208 because any
actions that formed the basis of the plaintiffs' claim "were taken in the
course and scope of his official duties." 2 0 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed,
concluding that "under international and domestic law, officials from other
countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant's official capacity." 2 10 The court's decision to deny immunity was led by the gravity of the
alleged offense, irrespective of the foreign-cubedness of the claim or the
indirectness of the liability. Accordingly, there would seem to be nothing
about Kiobel or RJR Nabisco that would alter this case outcome.
Similarly, in Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, the plaintiff, a Ghanaian national, sued a Ghanaian government official in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking jurisdiction under the
ATS. 2 1 1The plaintiff alleged that he was imprisoned for one year on suspicion of planning a government overthrow and that, during that time, he was
tortured while the defendant interrogated him. 2 1 2 Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the
court opined that "the FSIA 'will not shield an official who acts beyond the
scope of his authority,' "2 1 3 and that "the alleged acts of torture committed
by [the defendant] fall beyond the scope of his authority." 2 1 4 The court then
206. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 766 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S.
1156 (Jan. 13, 2014).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 767.
210. Id. at 777.
211. Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimal, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
212. Id. at 1191. See Weatherall, supra note 74, at 1153 ("Although such conduct
is often taken under 'color of law,' violations of jus cogens fall outside the official
capacity of State officials and are consequently not attributable to the State, depriving
that official of immunity ratione materiae [State immunity for official acts].").
213. Id. at 1197 (quoting Chuidian v. PhilippineNat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106
(9th Cir. 1990)).
214. Id. at 1198.
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determined that the plaintiff had jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. 2 15 This
rationale, again, should hold under existing Supreme Court precedent.
Additionally, in In re Estate of Marcos, the Ninth Circuit held that
foreign sovereign immunity would not shield the estate from jus cogens
claims brought pursuant to the ATS. 2 16 The court deemed jus cogens violations beyond the scope of authority of a government official and accordingly not protected by foreign sovereign immunity. 217
Conversely, in Dogan v. Barak, the court opted not to follow cases that
denied immunity to a foreign official accused of a jus cogens violation,
despite that it "agree[d] in principle that immunity doctrines should not
shield persons who violate jus cogens norms." 2 18 The court was compelled
by what it saw as the larger goal of preventing the "eviscerati[on] [of] the
immunity of all foreign officials." 2 19 Despite this outcome, the court did
evaluate the significance of the jus cogens claim,2 2 0 where the plaintiffs
accused a former Israeli foreign minister of liability for causing torture and
extrajudicial killing. 22 1
To determine whether this official was entitled to immunity despite
this allegation, the court performed a balancing test. It found that the need
to protect the goal of immunity (e.g., disallowing suits over State conduct
so that States are free to act) outweighed the need to protect the goal of the
international law community (e.g., vindicate a bedrock norm designed to
hold accountable those responsible for the gravest human rights abuses).
The court's decision was aided substantially by a formal statement from the
Israeli Government asserting that the defendant was acting within the scope
of his duties when the subject events occurred 222 and a Suggestion of Immunity from the United States Government, also supporting the defendant. 223
The statement from the Israeli Government served to convince the court
that the defendant was not at any relevant time engaged in ultra vires conduct, altogether challenging the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant's
conduct violated an international norm.
215. Id.
216. Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1472.
217. Id.
218. Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15 CV-08130-ODW(GSJx) 2016 WL 6024416 at *10
(citing Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 775-77).
219. Id.

220. Id.
221. See generally Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416.
222. Id. at *Il.

223. Id. at *10. The United States Government argued that the court should not
recognize a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity.

The Whole Wide World

2017-2018]

77

Despite the differences between these decisions, all of them show that
some courts, in some factual settings, pause to consider the significance of
the jus cogens claim before them. In Yousuf, Cabiri, and In re Estate of
Marcos, at least, the courts took the jus cogens claims so seriously that they
deemed them preemptive of the defendants' immunity. When considering
the propriety of ATS jurisdiction over claims of direct liability for a jus
cogens violation against a natural person, courts should certainly evaluate
the legal significance of that violation. International law demands this treatment given that ajus cogens norm endeavors to protect individuals from the
most heinous conduct; it reigns supreme over other international law norms,
offends every State and requires every State's attention. Kiobel and RJR
Nabisco do not command a different response. Neither case concerned these
Filartiga-typefacts. Moreover, ajus cogens violation, because of its abhorrence and function at international law, touches and concerns every nation.
Conduct that is relevant for one State should be relevant for another.
The United States is, irrespective of Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, subject
to international law. There is no opt-out option for any State from the category of international law known as jus cogens. The question, though, is
whether these two cases allow the vindication of this norm through the
ATS. This article contends that they do.

VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

.

The jus cogens norm is sui generis. Given the seriousness of its violation, as well as the guidance of Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, this article recommends that when confronted with a request for ATS jurisdiction over a
claim alleging direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural
person, courts do the following 224
(1) assume that the obvious is the focus of the ATS jurisdiction over
a claim by a foreign national alleging a tort in violation of international law; 225

(2) determine whether violation of the jus cogens norm in question
falls within the focus;
(3) if it does not, end the inquiry;
(4) if it does, determine the conduct relevant to that focus;
224. Focusing onjus cogens breaches imposes a limit on the kind and quantity of
claims subject to the treatment proposed.
225. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 197 ("[T]he focus is on conduct that violates international law, which the ATS seeks to regulate by giving federal courts jurisdiction over
such claims."); Mustafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[T]he
focus of the ATS is on conduct and the location of that conduct.").
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(5) recognize that no territorial limit applies to conduct relevant to a
jus cogens violation;
(6) recognize that ajus cogens violation touches and concerns every
State, including the United States;
(6) consider the significance of an allegation of a direct violation of a
jus cogens norm;226
(8) consider the significance of such an allegation against a natural
person; 227 and

(9) consider comity concerns.

228

Such an approach might add clarity to an opaque jurisdictional process
and allow more detailed consideration of the kinds of claims that gave rise
to the ATS in the first place, e.g., international law violations as heinous as
piracy.
CONCLUSION

Neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco expressly prohibit a Filartiga-type
claim and so, barring relevant Supreme Court or congressional action,
courts should not reflexively dismiss these claims on the ground that no
conduct relevant to the focus of the ATS occurred in the United States. In
evaluating what remains of ATS jurisdiction after these two decisions, it is
important to remember some key realities. There is nothing different about
the ATS itself from Filartigato today. There is nothing different about the
scope of the law of nations violations recognized under the statute. Likewise, there is nothing different about the meaning of ajus cogens violation.
Finally, there is nothing in Kiobel and RJR Nabisco that expressly addresses
Filartiga-typefacts, so the Filartiga-typeclaim should not necessarily be
subject to the same fate as the Kiobel-type claim.
Pre-Kiobelcourts were compelled by allegations of direct liability for
ajus cogens violation. Despite Kiobel's and RJR Nabisco'scircumscription
of some ATS claims, as noted above, that circumscription does not, ipso
facto, preclude jurisdiction over all ATS claims. Given a claim of direct
226. Perhaps such an allegation would suggest a degree of culpability that warrants immediate judicial attention. That is not at all to say that facts alleging aiding and
abetting liability, particularly against a corporation, cannot be egregious and reflect a
culpability as profound as the most heinous claim of direct liability for a jus cogens
violation against a natural person.
227. Perhaps such an allegation would allow the court to hold to account the very
person responsible for committing the jus cogens violation.
228. Perhaps there would be limited foreign affairs implications to an exercise of
universal jurisdiction if the defendant is a natural person and sued for a jus cogens
violation. Quite unlike a corporation, a natural person is not likely to be so closely
intertwined with a State despite that person's nationality.

2017-2018]

The Whole Wide World

79

liability for ajus cogens violation against a natural person, the nationality of
the parties and the location of the offending conduct should, even under
Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, become much less relevant. The fact of a jus
cogens violation presupposes the offense of every State. By this logic such
an offense should not offend comity (the main reason that the Supreme
Court restricted ATS jurisdiction in the first place) or at least not in a way
that the international community is unprepared to countenance.
Courts should in no way, of course, assume that Kiobel and RJR
Nabisco mean nothing for some types of claims brought pursuant to the
ATS. Kiobel involved a claim of indirect liability for ajus cogens violation
against a corporation. There, the Court was clearly concerned with the effect of the extraterritorial application of the ATS on corporations and not
natural persons. The Kiobel holding, then, should be viewed in the light of
the Kiobel facts and applied accordingly. RJR Nabisco concerned a RICO
claim against a corporation. It did not concern ajus cogens claim against a
natural person. Courts should also limit its utility pursuant to its facts.
Courts should not assume that either of these cases poses an insurmountable
barrier to foreign-cubed claims. As the foregoing discussion attempts to
demonstrate, the ATS continues to be viable for some of these claimsincluding the kind perhaps brought by the Yazidis.

